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some meaning. If a state statute in force at the time of cession can control in
the enclave, nothing is left for the word "exclusive" to mean except that subsequently passed state statutes can never control in the enclave. This argument can be effectively countered, however, because the exclusiveness of federal
legislative pQwer is not at all impaired by the control in the enclave of a state
statute passed subsequent to cession. Congress can nullify the application
of a state statute passed subsequent to cession by enacting a contrary statute.
Congress retains the ultimate or "exclusive" control of the enclave. Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17 is satisfied.
Therefore, no reason appears why the Supreme Court should stop short
of allowing subsequently passed state statutes to control in a federal enclave.
It now holds the midstream position that, if the state statute is enforced before
the federal enclave is created and if the statute does not conflict with a federal statute, the state statute applies in the enclave. A federal statute can
allow a subsequently passed state statute to control. Such is the Supreme Court's
present position but the holding of the Colorado Supreme Court in Donoho and
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Pacific Coast appear to
this writer the better reasoning.
ALFRED HETZELT
SALE OF ENDOWMENT POLICY To AvoID ORDINARY INCOME TAX TREATMENT
Congress introduced capital gain provisions into the tax structure with
the Revenue Act of 1918. The 1954 Code, as well as its predecessors, contained
similar provisions. One of the primary purposes for the retention of these
provisions is the elevation of burdensome taxation in certain transactions falling within their scope. The constitutionality of such a tax has never been
seriously questioned since the Supreme Court decided the case of Merchant's
Loan and Trust Company v. Smnietanka.1 There the Court decided that income,
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, included
profit gained through the sale or conversion of a capital asset. The constitutional issue had thus been laid to rest; but since that date the courts have
continually been asked to determine whether certain transactions give rise to
capital gains or ordinary income. The government is anxious to prevent any
attempt to deplete its revenue intake, while the taxpayer, with equal diligence,
is seeking to minimize or to avoid taxes altogether. The battle lines are
thus drawn.
In order to take advantage of the capital gain provision certain basic
requirements spelled out in the Internal Revenue Code must be met. The
property dealt with must be a capital asset as defined by the Code. 2 Secondly,
any gain or loss resulting to the taxpayer must be the result of a sale or
1.

255 U.S. 509 (1921).

2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1221.
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exchange. 3 If the property is then held for the length of time required, 4 the
technical provisions of the Code will be satisfied and the gain realized by the
taxpayer should be taxable at the capital gain rates.5 Although this is an
oversimplification of the tax structure, it is essentially the procedure used to
determine whether the capital gain provisions apply. As will be seen from the
decisions of the various courts, the application of these principles to different
fact situations often results in inconsistent determinations. The "underbrush"
of confusion is not being cleared away.
There are certain well defined areas in which the capital gain provisions
do not apply. It is settled that the gain resulting from the surrender of an
endowment or annuity contract, at maturity, is subject to ordinary income
tax rates.0
The question of whether the gain resulting from a sale of such a policy
to a third party before maturity is not so well settled. In 1941 the Tax Court
held that the gain resulting from the sale of a life insurance policy was taxable
at capital gain rates In 1958, The Tax Court in Phillips v. Commissioner,8
one judge dissenting, ruled that the gain resulting from a sale of an endowment policy twelve days before its maturity date should be taxed at the
capital gain rates. The Tax Court decided that there had been a bona fide
sale of a capital asset. The Court was aware that the sale was primarily
motivated by the taxpayer's desire to minimize his taxes. However the Tax
Court pointed out that it is the legal right of a taxpayer to minimize his taxes
or avoid them altogether by any means which the law permits. The Tax
Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that though there was a bona
fide sale, this fact alone could not convert what would be ordinary income at
the maturity of the policy to a capital gain from the sale of the policy twelve
days before maturity. The Tax Court further found that the gain to the
taxpayer was to a large extent due to the appreciated value of the capital
investment of the policy holder and not solely to interest earnings on this investment. The appreciation in value of the taxpayers capital investment was
in a large measure the result of favorable investment practice and economic
power of the insurance company.
Shortly after the Phillips Case was decided by the Tax Court, the Court
of Claims was presented with a similar fact situation in Arnfeld v. Commissioner.9 The issue presented in Arnfeld was whether money realized by the
taxpayer upon the sale of an annuity contract, before maturity, constituted
ordinary income or capital gain. The Court of Claims ruled that the gain
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 Subchapter P.
4. Int. Rev. ,Code of 1954 §§ 1222, 1223.
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1201.
6. Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 982 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
576 (1939).
7. Reingold v. Commissioner, B.T.A. Memo 868-B (1941).
8. 30 T.C. 866 (1958).
9. 163 F. Supp. 865 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959).
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realized by the taxpayer was taxable as ordinary income and not as capital
gain. The decision was based on the theory that the sale of the right to
future income will not result in capital gain treatment.
After the decision in the Arnfeld Case, the Phillips Case was appealed to
the Court of Appeals in the Fourth Circuit. 10 This time the conflict was resolved in favor of the commissioner and against the taxpayers. In reversing
the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals held that what transpired, under the
facts of the case before it, was a present receipt by the taxpayer of a sum
of money in exchange for the right to future income, and was thus taxable
at ordinary income rates. The Court of Appeals did not question the right
of the taxpayer to minimize his tax," nor did the Court controvert the position taken by the taxpayer that there existed a bona fide sale. The Court
did not deny that an endowment policy was "property" but stated that it did
not necessarily follow that everything termed "property" or "capital" should
be accorded capital gain treatment, citing Hoyt v. Commissioner.12 The Hort
Case involved the cancellation of a lease wherein the lessee, in consideration
for said cancellation, paid to the lessor a sum of money substantially equal
to the amount the lessor would have received as rent had the lease not been
terminated. The court found that the taxpayer was in effect receiving future
rental payments, clearly ordinary income.
It may very well be that the Hort Case can stand for the proposition
that everything that is termed "property" need not be accorded capital gain
treatment, but it seems apparent that at this point, a similarity of the Hort
Case to the Phillips Case ends. In the Phillips Case there was a sale of an
endowment policy by the taxpayer to a third party. The Hort Case did not
deal with a total assignment or sale of a capital asset to a third party, but
rather a cancellation or surrender of the lease to the lessors. The Hoyt Case
is analogous to a situation where a policyholder surrenders his policy to the
Insurance Company. In a situation where an insurance policy is surrendered
or where a lessee effects a cancellation of his lease, there does not seem to be
a true sale or exchange as required under the capital gain provisions.
However, the Court of Appeals in the Phillips Case did not rely heavily
on the Hort Case, but rather on the Arnfeld decision and the Supreme Court's
decision in P. G. Lake v. Commissioner.'3 Arnfeld had relied for much of its
vitality on the decision in the Lake Case. The Supreme Court in the Lake
Case had to determine the consequences of a transaction involving oil payment rights. There the taxpayers had assigned these oil payment rights for
a present consideration. These partial assignments were to run for stipulated
lengths of time, but for terms less than the terms held by the assignor. These
assignments gave to the assignees certain percentage interest in the monies
10. Commissioner v. Phillips, 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960).
11. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
12.

313 U.S. 28 (1941).

13. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
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realized under the oil payment rights for the periods stipulated between the
parties. When these assigned oil payment rights had expired, the total oil
payment right again would be held by the assignors who had retained reversionary interests. The Supreme Court determined that the consideration
received for these assignments was a present receipt of future income. The
gain resulting to the taxpayer was held to be taxable at ordinary income rates.
Whatever the decision in the Lake Case represents, it does not appear
to be controlling in either the Arnfeld or the Phillips cases. The Supreme
Court in the Lake Case did not decide what the consequences would have been
had the taxpayers sold their complete interests in the oil payments rights.
If the Phillips Case is citing the Lake Case for this proposition, it seems to
be an unwarranted extension of the Supreme Court's decision. The taxpayer
in the Arnfeld Case attempted to distinguish the Lake decision on the
grounds that in the Arnfeld Case the taxpayer had sold her entire property
interests. In answering this argument, the Court of Claims conceded they
were working in an uncertain area and reasoned from the Hort Case that
whether or not the annuity contract was property was not dispositive of the
issue. Since the taxpayer's argument was found "inconsistent" with the
principle announced in Hort, the Court of Claims saw no reason to adopt it.
It is interesting to note a ruling made by the Commissioner in 1950.11
The ruling involved the Commissioner's opinion as to transactions dealing
It is therefore
with oil-payment rights. It reads in part as follows "...
the present position of the Bureau that the assignment of any in-oil payment
right . . . which extends for a period less than the life of the depletable
property interest from which it is carved, is essentially the assignment of
expected income from such property interests. Therefore the assignment . . .
results in the receipt of ordinary income by the assignor. . . Notwithstanding
the foregoing, G.C.M., . . . and I.T. 3935 . . . , do not apply where the
assigned in-oil payment right constitutes the entire depletable interest of the
assignor in the property or a fraction extending over the entire interest of
the property." It is apparent then, that the Commissioner has drawn a distinction between a partial and total assignment of property rights. There
is a very close analogy between the Commissioner's I.T. Bulletin and the
argument of the taxpayer in the Arnfeld Case.
A re-argument was had in the Phillips Case in which the Commissioner
conceded that in certain circumstances a taxpayer could realize a capital
gain by selling his endowment policy before maturity. In this re-argument,
a hypothetical situation was posed wherein the taxpayer, dying of an incurable
disease, sold an endowment policy before maturity for more than its then
present surrender value but less then its value at maturity.
We are thus faced with a rather perplexing situation.
14. I.T. 4003 (1950).
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Appeals in the Phillips Case concedes that there existed a bona fide sale. The
Commissioner conceded that under certain circumstances an endowment policy
could be the subject of a capital gain. Yet, under the facts as they existed
in the Phillips Case, the Commissioner had ruled that the gain from the sale
should be taxed at ordinary income rates. Furthermore, the Commissioner,
in his I.T. Bulletin mentioned above, gives good grounds for distinguishing
the Lake Case from the Phillips Case. Taking these things as they stand, there
exists all the requirements necessary to obtain capital gain treatment, yet
that is not the result in the Phillips Case. It may very well be that the Court
of Appeals and the Commissioner, seeing an evasion of tax at ordinary income
rates, decided to plug the gap through which the taxpayer squeezed. But in
the same breath, the Court of Appeals freely admits that a taxpayer suffers
no penalties for legally attempting to evade tax.
It is difficult to justify the position taken by the Fourth Circuit in the
Phillips Case. At least one writer feels that the Court's decision might be
construed to mean that the sale of an endowment policy will not be considered
as within the capital gains provisions if there is an obvious attempt on the
part of the taxpayer to avoid ordinary income tax rates. 1r Even if the holding
is construed this narrowly, the result does not seem justifiable. No one would
question the decision of the Court of Appeals had there appeared some type
of collusion between the taxpayer and the third party who purchased his policy.
It is precisely in a collusive scheme where the Courts should look behind
the technical provisions of the law and expose an illegal means of avoiding
tax. But when the courts admit that there exists an arm's length transaction
resulting in a bona fide sale and the technical provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code have been met, the logical result should be a determination
that the sale gives rise to a capital gain.
Certiorari was not applied for in this case because there was not a conflict of circuits, i.e., no other Court of Appeals, including the Court of Claims,
had rendered a decision on the question involved, which was contrary to the
result reached by the Fourth Circuit in Commissioner v. Phillips. The significance of the situation for the individual litigant is that he may not get his
case reviewed by the Supreme Court no matter how erroneous the decision
of the Court of Appeals may be. The broader implication of the Supreme
Court's refusal to review unless there is a conflict in the circuits, imports the
dire consequences of having bad law, roaming abroad and capable of much
harm, until the fortuitous occurrence of an opposite decision in a different
circuit.
RICHARD ATTEA
15.

12

J.
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